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Personal Jurisdiction in Comparative Context†
This Article places the recent evolution of U.S. personal jurisdiction
in comparative context. Comparativism helps illuminate and explain
both the modest convergences and the more pervasive divergences. On
the convergences side, the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of transnational litigation and express invocation of European approaches to
personal jurisdiction have helped move general jurisdiction away from
the exorbitant “doing business” jurisdiction that seemed previously to
be settled U.S. law. But persistent divergences tell the more interesting
story. The Court’s refusal to deviate from its commitment to transient
jurisdiction, its recent narrowing of specific jurisdiction since 2011, its
implicit rejection of pendent-party personal jurisdiction, and its adherence to a strong form of consent-based personal jurisdiction all reveal
a stark contrast with other countries’ approaches to personal jurisdiction. That contrast is founded on deep and stubborn ties to American
history, political structure, and litigation norms, all of which make
broader convergence difficult, if not implausible. For these reasons,
U.S. personal-jurisdiction doctrine is more likely to continue to develop
on an independent track rather than hew to global trends. Some areas
of parallelism might still occur, but substantial convergence is likely to
remain elusive.
Introduction
In the United States, personal jurisdiction—known elsewhere as
part of “jurisdiction to adjudicate”—is the power of a court to enter a
binding judgment governing the rights and obligations of the parties
in a case. In a world of many sovereigns and many courts, personal
jurisdiction helps determine which sovereign’s courts can hear a case,
and that determination is influenced by the nature of the parties and
their connections to the forum.
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1. Cf. Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 422 (Am. Law Inst.
2018) (Reporters’ Note 11) (“This Section restates rules of personal jurisdiction exclusively as domestic law of the United States.”).
2. Interstate federalism, often also called horizontal federalism, refers to the
relationships among the states of the United States, as opposed to the relationship of
the states to the national government.
3. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014) (noting consistency between the new test for general jurisdiction and the scope of jurisdiction in other countries). See also J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909 & n.16 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the conflict between the case result and the personal
jurisdiction law of other countries).

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article/68/4/701/5907689 by Hastings College of the Law Library user on 17 August 2021

The United States treats personal jurisdiction as domestic law1:
each sovereign can set its own rules. Those rules begin with constitutional and statutory prescriptions of U.S. personal jurisdiction, but the
codifications are open ended and vague, so the work developing the
doctrine has fallen primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, in the
United States, the Court’s opinions set the justification and scope for
personal jurisdiction.
Those opinions largely have attended to U.S. doctrine without regard to the law of judicial jurisdiction in other countries. Instead, the
Court has looked to features unique to the American experience: interstate federalism,2 constitutional due process, court precedent, and the
tug of history. That grounding formed a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that was, for many years, rather exceptional when compared to
foreign norms and trends.
In the last few years, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has
refocused on personal jurisdiction and has handed down a flurry of
decisions that reveal a new evolution in the doctrine. There is some
indication in those recent decisions that the Court is paying closer
attention to how other countries structure jurisdiction to adjudicate,
and how the reach of U.S. courts could affect the interests of foreign
countries. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in particular, has tried to
steer U.S. doctrine more in line with the scope of personal jurisdiction elsewhere, and, at least with respect to general jurisdiction, she
has largely succeeded.3 But in other contexts, American personal jurisdiction remains stubbornly exceptional. And even the Court’s recent
effort to move general jurisdiction toward restrictions common in the
rest of the world has resulted, perhaps ironically, in a rigidity that creates new tensions with the laws of other countries.
This Article places the recent evolution of U.S. personal jurisdiction in comparative context. Comparativism helps illuminate and
explain both the modest convergences and the more pervasive divergences. On the convergences side, the justices’ own international
travel, acknowledgment of transnational litigation, and express invocation of European approaches to personal jurisdiction have helped
move general jurisdiction away from the exorbitant “doing business”
jurisdiction that seemed previously to be settled U.S. law. That movement overcomes a major obstacle to U.S. participation in international
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I. Personal Jurisdiction in the United States
This Part sets out the U.S. law on personal jurisdiction. It starts
with some foundational principles, then lays out the law prior to the
new wave of cases that began in 2011, and concludes with the post2011 changes.
A. Foundational Principles
Two key attributes of the United States have influenced U.S. personal jurisdiction in distinctive ways. The first is the federal structure
of the United States, which exhibits both national sovereignty and
independent state sovereignty. Because state courts are creatures of
their own state and not of other states or of the United States government, the personal jurisdiction of state courts is limited by the
sovereign interests of sister states. This federal structure influences
U.S. personal jurisdiction in a number of ways. Most importantly, it
glosses U.S. personal jurisdiction with the need to protect interstate
harmony. Although federal courts arguably do not have to worry
about interstate friction because they are beholden to the national
4. One possibility is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (July 2, 2019), www.hcch.net/
en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137 (not yet in force) [hereinafter 2019
Judgments Convention]. Although the 2019 Judgments Convention focuses on jurisdiction only indirectly, as part of judgment recognition and enforcement, the Judgments
Project will now turn to matters relating to direct jurisdiction.
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agreements on judgment recognition that may now be back on the
table.4 Personal jurisdiction, in many ways, is about inter-sovereign
relationships, and, at the very least, the recent trends suggest that the
Court is taking those relationships seriously.
But the persistent divergences tell the more interesting story.
The Court’s refusal to deviate from its commitment to transient jurisdiction, its narrowing of specific jurisdiction, its implicit rejection of
pendent-party personal jurisdiction, and its adherence to a strong form
of consent-based personal jurisdiction all reveal a stark contrast with
other countries’ approaches to personal jurisdiction. That contrast is
founded on deep-seated ties to American history, political structure,
and litigation norms, all of which make broader convergence difficult,
if not implausible. At the same time, the new cases reveal a doctrine
still in search of a rationale, and the unsettled moorings means that
U.S. personal jurisdiction is likely to drift in unpredictable ways in the
near term.
For these reasons, U.S. personal-jurisdiction doctrine, as molded
by the U.S. Supreme Court, is more likely to continue to develop on an
independent track rather than hew to foreign trends. Some areas of
parallelism might still occur, but substantial convergence is likely to
remain elusive.
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B. Personal Jurisdiction Prior to 2011
Until the mid-1900s, a state court’s personal jurisdiction, absent
consent or waiver, was typically limited to parties residing in or served
within the court’s state.10 That presence-based concept was tested by
5. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires
a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”).
6. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). There are some deviations from this general rule of
federal law. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer,
117 Mich. L. Rev. 1463, 1474 n.67 (2019) (listing statutory grants of nationwide
service).
7. U.S. Const. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
8. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702–03 n.10 (1982).
9. A foreign defendant, for example, is far more likely than a domestic defendant
to convince a court that a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was fundamentally
unfair. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116
Mich. L. Rev. 1205, 1214–15 (2018). See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 480
U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) (recognizing the “unique burdens placed upon one who must
defendant oneself in a foreign legal system”).
10. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”); id. at 722 (“[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory.”). I will not address in-rem or quasi in-rem
jurisdiction here.
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sovereign rather than any one state, the scope of personal jurisdiction
in state court and in federal court are roughly equivalent. For state
courts, the Constitution ties personal jurisdiction to the particular
state’s personal-jurisdiction reach.5 For federal courts, although the
Constitution ties personal jurisdiction to the personal-jurisdiction
reach of the United States as a whole, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure typically peg the personal-jurisdiction reach of a federal
court to the same scope as that applicable to a state court.6 The result is that the purely domestic concern of interstate federalism has
played a significant role in the development of the doctrine.
The second attribute is the protection, in the U.S. Constitution, of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of “due process,”7
which the Supreme Court has identified as the source of the constitutional limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction.8 Importantly,
the Constitution sets an outer reach of adjudicatory authority; the
particular court’s sovereign can further restrict that reach by statute
or rule, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do, for example, for
federal courts. Because the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses do not
distinguish between domestic and foreign parties, nor do most statutory or rule-based authorizations of jurisdiction to adjudicate, U.S. law
of personal jurisdiction typically does not distinguish between domestic and foreign defendants, though the distinction does play a role
in application of the doctrine.9
With these two attributes in mind, the next subsections provide
an account of the development of U.S. personal jurisdiction.
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11. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
12. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
13. See Alexandra Lahav, The New Privity 17 (July 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3413349.
14. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
15. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (ex ante consent);
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1983) (plaintiff consent by initiating the case in
the court); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (waiver and forfeiture).
16. See Burnham v. Sup. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Prior to Burnham, some commentators and courts inferred an International Shoe reasonableness check on transient jurisdiction. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 28 (Am. Law Inst.
rev. ed. 1988) (“A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
who is present within its territory unless the individual’s relationship to the state is
so attenuated as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.”). Although
Burnham does not resolve whether the exercise of transient jurisdiction is subject to
a reasonableness analysis, Burnham makes clear that any reasonableness check is de
minimis. Compare Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion) (“[J]urisdiction based
on physical presence alone constitutes due process.”), with id. at 639 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[A]s a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based
on his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due process.”).
See also Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 422 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst.
2018) (“General jurisdiction also exists if the defendant is a natural person and has
been personally served with process within the forum.”).
17. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1,
17 (2018). The U.S. terms “specific jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” are not commonly used in other countries, but they are grounded in a division between claim-based
jurisdiction and defendant-home jurisdiction that has analogues in other countries.
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the rise of corporations and interstate activities, and, in 1945, the
Supreme Court decided the path-marking case of International Shoe v.
Washington, which added a new way for a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who was not served in the forum
state: when the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the
forum state such that “the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”11 International Shoe and its progeny
indicated that personal jurisdiction serves two interests: protecting
the individual litigant’s right to be free from the burdens of litigating
afar, and an interstate federalism interest in keeping the states from
infringing on each other’s sovereignty.12 International Shoe also ushered in a new kind of personal-jurisdiction doctrine founded on standards and balancing tests rather than rules.13
Today, the Supreme Court recognizes four discrete bases for personal jurisdiction under the Constitution. First, a state always has jurisdiction over its residents even when they are out of state when sued.14
Second, a state has jurisdiction over a nonresident if the nonresident
consents to jurisdiction, either by ex ante contract or by ex post waiver
or forfeiture of jurisdictional objections.15 Third, a state has personal jurisdiction over an individual nonresident who is personally served while
in the forum state (so-called tag or transient jurisdiction).16 Fourth, a
state has jurisdiction over a nonresident when the nonresident’s contacts meet the “minimum contacts” test of International Shoe.
This fourth basis for personal jurisdiction—minimum contacts—
is further divided into two species.17 The first species—“specific
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18. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
19. Id. The five fairness factors are the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff ’s
interest in obtaining effective relief, the interest of the forum state, the policies of
other states or nations, and the judicial system’s interest in efficiency. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987).
20. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (identifying contacts that reap “the benefits and protections of the laws of that state”).
21. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102.
22. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
23. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1984).
24. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980)
(“The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum State.”). E.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761,
766 (Ill. 1961); Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 106 S.E.2d 704 (N.C. 1959); Nixon v. Cohn,
385 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1963); O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 194 A.2d 568 (Vt. 1963);
Andersen v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965); Marathon Battery
Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965).
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jurisdiction”—applies when the defendant’s minimum contacts with
the forum state give rise to or are related to the cause of action. Under
specific jurisdiction, even a single contact with the forum state can
justify personal jurisdiction, if the contact is significant enough that
it would be fair and reasonable for the forum state to exercise personal jurisdiction. A key example is Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,18
which allowed a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose only connections to the forum state were encompassed in
the contract that was the subject of the cause of action. Burger King
also noted that personal jurisdiction encompassed five “fairness factors,” which could raise or lower the minimum level of contacts needed
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, though the Court remained vague how that interaction would work in practice.19
Up through the 1980s, the development of specific jurisdiction
was episodic and thus difficult to synthesize into a coherent whole. For
example, although the Court offered some guidance about what qualitative contacts were meaningful,20 the Court left open how direct a
defendant’s contacts with the forum state had to be21 and how related
to the cause of action the defendant’s contacts had to be.22 Further, the
Court seemed to suggest that the plaintiff’s connection to the forum
state could be meaningful.23 Still, the standards produced workable
guidance for the lower courts, which, over time, applied them fairly
consistently in ways that mimicked rules. For example, the state
courts developed (and the Supreme Court later endorsed) a rule that
the minimum-contacts test subjected manufacturers to personal jurisdiction wherever their products caused injury, if the distribution of
their products to that state was foreseeable.24
The second species of “minimum contacts” is called “general jurisdiction” and applies to nonresidents who are sued in a state for
a cause of action unrelated to the nonresident’s contacts with the
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25. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–17. See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318
(stating that “continuous corporation operations within a state [can be] so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities”).
26. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that the language had been “taught to generations of first-year law students”); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. L. Rev.
721, 767 (1988) (“Courts currently measure the sufficiency of unrelated business contacts between the forum state and the defendant with the continuous and systematic
test.”). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which was drafted shortly after
the original general-jurisdiction case of Perkins v. Benguet, 342 U.S. 437 (1952), provides a slightly different formulation that does not account for subsequent generaljurisdiction gloss: “A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation which does business in the state with respect to causes of action that do not
arise from the business done in the state if this business is so continuous and substantial as to make it reasonable for the state to exercise such jurisdiction.” Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 47(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1971). See also id. § 47 cmt. e (citing
to Perkins).
27. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 73, 75
(2018). The United States distinguishes personal jurisdiction from venue, which is
a statutory mechanism designed to select the proper set of courts within a judicial
system based on convenience and efficiency. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Thus, although
a broad formulation of general jurisdiction might allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over McDonald’s in any state, venue directives might limit the range of proper
federal courts to just one or two federal districts.
28. See Meir Ferer, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 671, 675 (2012) (“[L]ower courts widely embraced the notion that any corporation ‘doing business’ in a state was subject to general jurisdiction there.”). For critiques of doing business jurisdiction, see Patrick J. Borchers, The
Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Chi. Legal F. 119; Mary Twitchell, Why We
Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Chi. Legal F. 171.
29. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”); id. at 702 n.10 (“The restriction on
sovereign power described in [prior cases] . . . must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the
only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no
mention of federalism concerns.”).
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state.25 General jurisdiction requires significantly more contacts than
specific jurisdiction. Until 2011, general jurisdiction was understood
to require “continuous and systematic” contacts,26 a formulation that
might subject large businesses with significant operations in all fifty
states (like, say, McDonald’s) to general jurisdiction in any state for
any cause of action.27 Some lower courts and commentators even
equated general jurisdiction with “doing business” jurisdiction, which
would subject defendants to general jurisdiction anywhere they did
business, even if the suit arose for reasons other than the business
conducted in that state.28
During this time, the Court appeared to settle on an underlying
theory of “minimum contacts” jurisdiction as primarily a due process
right based on fairness and reasonableness, rather than as a component of interstate federalism and sovereign limits.29 Because personal
jurisdiction has features of an individual right, personal jurisdiction
is a defendant-by-defendant inquiry, with constitutional standards
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C. Personal Jurisdiction After 2011
U.S. law has not deviated from its adherence to transient jurisdiction34 or to its understanding that parties can establish personal jurisdiction by consent or waiver. However, starting in 2011, the Supreme
Court began to restrict other facets of personal jurisdiction.35 The
Court decided a series of six cases—three on specific jurisdiction and
three on general jurisdiction—that dramatically narrowed both species of “minimum contacts” jurisdiction over nonresidents.
The first in the specific jurisdiction line is J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro.36 There, a New Jersey resident, injured in New Jersey
by a metal-shearing machine, sued the machine’s British manufacturer in New Jersey state court.37 The manufacturer contracted with
an American distributor (who was not sued) to sell machines in the
United States, but the manufacturer did not specifically target New
Jersey. The facts accepted by a majority of the justices indicated that
just one of the machines entered New Jersey. Those two facts were
dispositive for the Court. The plurality held that specific targeting
of New Jersey was indispensable for New Jersey to exercise personal jurisdiction, even when the manufacturer generally targeted
the United States as a whole.38 The concurrence held that the lack
of state-specific targeting, coupled with such a low number of products entering the forum state, was sufficient to deny jurisdiction.39
The dissent would have held that New Jersey’s exercise of personal
30. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
31. U.S. rules do authorize a very limited form of pendent-party jurisdiction in
federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B) (authorizing personal jurisdiction over defendants joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 if served within 100 miles of the forum
courthouse).
32. Dodson, supra note 17, at 21–22.
33. Id.
34. See supra text accompanying note 16.
35. Dodson, supra note 17, at 5.
36. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
37. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 886–87.
39. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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applicable as to each defendant.30 Thus, U.S. courts have not adopted
a pendent-jurisdiction doctrine that would allow personal jurisdiction
over one defendant simply because the forum had personal jurisdiction over another defendant on a related claim in the same action.31
However, some lower federal courts adopted a doctrine of pendent
personal jurisdiction over joined related claims against the same defendant.32 The rationale was that once the defendant is properly before
the court on one claim, there was no unfairness or unreasonableness
in having the court adjudicate all other related claims against that
defendant, even if the court would lack personal jurisdiction over the
defendant based on those related claims alone.33
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40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 880–81 (plurality opinion); id. at 900–01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
571 U.S. 277 (2014).
Id. at 284–85.
Dodson, supra note 17, at 24.
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
Id. at 1780–82.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article/68/4/701/5907689 by Hastings College of the Law Library user on 17 August 2021

jurisdiction was reasonable based on the fact that the injury occurred
there, that the manufacturer directly targeted the United States as a
whole, and that even a single machine was a significant sale.40
Although Nicastro lacked a controlling opinion, the case makes
two important moves. First, Nicastro unsettles the theory behind personal jurisdiction, which previously was grounded primarily in a due
process right and in notions of fairness rather than in sovereignty or
interstate federalism; four Nicastro justices would have held personal
jurisdiction to be about consent to the adjudicatory authority of the
sovereign; three would have held personal jurisdiction to be about the
reasonableness of the sovereign’s exercise of adjudicatory authority;
and two expressed skepticism of both positions.41 Second, Nicastro is
controlling authority for the proposition that targeting of the United
States in general, coupled with a single sale that causes harm in the
United States, is not enough to confer specific jurisdiction in a state
court. That authority means that a foreign manufacturer might be immune from U.S. personal jurisdiction despite manufacturing a product
for use in the United States that causes harm in the United States.
The next case in the specific jurisdiction line is Walden v. Fiore.42
There, the question was whether the plaintiff’s continuous harm suffered in the forum state was a connection between the forum and the
defendant sufficient to meet the minimum contacts test. The Court
answered no: the defendant must directly create contacts with the
forum state, and such contacts cannot arise solely because of the relationship of the plaintiff to the forum state.43 Walden “necessitates
a direct link between the defendant and the forum” and backs away
from prior cases that appeared to place some weight on the plaintiff ’s
location.44
In the third case, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court,45 plaintiffs from California and other states sued Bristol-Myers Squibb in
California for injuries sustained in their home states. All claims were
founded on the same theory of liability. Although California clearly
had personal jurisdiction over the California plaintiffs’ claims for injury sustained in California, the Court held that California did not
have personal jurisdiction over the non-California claims because
there was no connection between California and the non-California
claims.46 The rationale was not fairness (for Bristol-Myers Squibb was
already properly before a California court to defend the California
claims) but rather interstate sovereignty: that California adjudication
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Here, the Vehicle was last distributed by Ford when it was
sold to a dealership in Tennessee. There are no allegations
that it ended up in Missouri by the acts of Ford, its agent,
or its alter-ego. Because Ford did not commit particular acts
connecting to the Vehicle, this forum, and this litigation, no
specific personal jurisdiction over Ford exists in Missouri.49

47. Dodson, supra note 17, at 27–28.
48. Id. at 28.
49. M.J. v. Ford Motor Co., No. 4:19CV1846 HEA, 2019 WL 4194372 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 4, 2019).
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of non-California claims would infringe on the prerogatives of the
states where those injuries occurred.47
Bristol-Myers Squibb thus makes two moves. First, Bristol-Myers
Squibb requires a direct link between the defendant’s forum-related
activities and the claim.48 This determination undermines the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction widely adopted in the lower federal courts, at least as applied to claims brought by different plaintiffs
against a single defendant. Second, Bristol-Myers Squibb holds that
interstate federalism and state sovereignty are important components
of U.S. personal jurisdiction. This holding offers a new ground for restricting an otherwise reasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction.
These three cases alter the law of specific jurisdiction. Today, specific jurisdiction requires a direct link between the forum and the defendant and between the forum and the claim. Specific jurisdiction
also requires more than causing harm in the forum state, and the
plaintiff’s connection to the forum state is irrelevant except to the
extent that the plaintiff establishes a direct connection between the
forum and the defendant. Finally, even if otherwise reasonable, principles of interstate federalism and state sovereignty might restrict the
exercise of specific jurisdiction.
A recent example of the new restrictions on specific jurisdiction
is M.J. v. Ford Motor Co. There, a Missouri car owner’s daughter sued
Ford when the car owner died from an accident allegedly caused by a
Ford car’s defective steering wheel. The accident occurred in Missouri,
and the suit was brought in a Missouri federal district court. Ford is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan.
The facts showed that Ford sold the car in question to an independent
dealership in Tennessee. It was unclear how the car got to Missouri,
but, presumably, a consumer purchased it from the Tennessee dealership and drove it to Missouri. The facts also showed that Ford had
substantial business in Missouri, including maintaining offices and
manufacturing plants in Missouri, selling thousands of cars directly
in Missouri, and directly marketing cars similar to the car in question
in Missouri. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Ford, relying on Walden and Bristol-Myers Squibb, and
reasoning as follows:
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II. U.S. Personal Jurisdiction in a Comparative Context
This Part puts the U.S. law of personal jurisdiction in a comparative context. It analyzes the lines of convergence and points of divergence in the various manifestations of personal jurisdiction.
A. Transient Jurisdiction
The U.S. commitment to transient jurisdiction continues to
be shared by only a handful of other countries, such as the United
Kingdom. The EU and most other counties consider transient jurisdiction to be exorbitant and will refuse to honor judgments based upon
it.57 Nevertheless, the United States continues to adhere to transient
50. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
51. Id. at 924.
52. Id.
53. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
54. Id. at 122, 139–40 & nn.19–20.
55. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
56. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 9, at 1220 (“For alien defendants, . . . the
likelihood is that no U.S. state will be able to exercise general jurisdiction.”).
57. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century
or Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 111, 116 (1999). See also
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As this case makes clear, lower courts are finding a lack of specific
jurisdiction even when the injury occurs in the forum state and the
defendant has substantial and direct business with the forum state.
The Court’s restrictive turn in general jurisdiction began with
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in 2011.50 There, the
Court replaced the commonly accepted standard of “continuous and
systematic contacts” with contacts that were “so constant and pervasive” as to render the defendant “at home” in the state.51 “Paradigm”
examples include the domicile of an individual and the place of incorporation and principal place of business for a corporation.52 Daimler
AG v. Bauman,53 decided three years later, affirmed Goodyear, made
Goodyear’s “paradigm” examples presumptively exclusive, and emphasized that the “at home” test is comparative, in that the contacts
with the state must be assessed in light of the contacts the defendant
has with other states when determining where the defendant is “at
home.”54 Finally, in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,55 the Court reconfirmed its commitment to this new general jurisdiction framework.
These general-jurisdiction cases eliminate any vestige of “doing
business” jurisdiction and essentially reduce general jurisdiction to a
domicile test. No longer is McDonald’s subject to general jurisdiction
in all fifty states; rather, it is subject to general jurisdiction only in
two states: its state of incorporation and the state of its headquarters
offices. For foreign defendants, even if they do substantial business in
the United States, general jurisdiction likely does not exist at all.56
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B. Consent to Jurisdiction
By contrast, the U.S. commitment to consent as a basis for personal jurisdiction—and particularly ex ante consent by contract—is
shared with other countries, which largely recognize the ability of parties to consent to a particular court’s authority to resolve the dispute.59
However, while the United States adheres to a fairly broad notion of
consent, other countries are more willing to impose limits on contractbased consent to personal jurisdiction, particularly when suspected
unequal bargaining power between the contracting parties exists. For
example, the Brussels I Recast prevents ex ante contracts from superseding the jurisdictional provisions for consumer claims in ways that
disadvantage the consumer.60 The 2019 Judgments Convention disclaims judgment recognition if the judgment was entered based on ex
ante consent to jurisdiction and was against a consumer “in matters
relating to a consumer contract” or against “an employee in matters
relating to the employee’s contract of employment.”61 And the Choice
of Court Convention excludes employment contracts and certain other
specified claims from the otherwise presumptive jurisdiction in a contractually selected court.62 Similarly, the domestic law of individual
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 421 (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (acknowledging that service of process on a person only transitorily in the territory of the
state is not generally acceptable under international law). E.g., European Regulation
No. 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 5, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1
[hereinafter Brussels I Recast] (restricting EU jurisdiction to other grounds). For more
on exorbitant jurisdiction, see Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant
Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 474 (2006).
58. See Burbank, supra note 57, at 116.
59. See, e.g., Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 19 (acknowledging the general rule of consent); Minji Minsohō [Minsohō] [C. Civ. Pro.] 1996, art. 3-8 (Japan) (allowing waiver of the defense to personal jurisdiction); Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI
1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶¶ 3.1(6)–(7) (Eng.) (allowing parties to select English
courts by contract). See also Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 5,
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter Choice of Court Convention] (“The court or
courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall
have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies [absent specified
exceptions] . . . .”). For a comprehensive discussion, see Ronald A. Brand & Paul M.
Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and
Documents (2008).
60. Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 19 (providing that no private contracts
can supersede the consumer-claim provisions unless the contract arises after the dispute, or allows the consumer more choice of where to sue, or which confers jurisdiction
on the courts of a particular member state where both parties were “domiciled or habitually resident”).
61. 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2). For such parties, the
Judgments Convention allows judgment recognition if the judgment were entered
based on consent addressed orally or in writing to the judgment-rendering court. Id.
62. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 59, art. 2(1).
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jurisdiction, at least for individuals, reflecting a part of the doctrine
that is deeply and stubbornly rooted in history and tradition.58
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C. Specific Jurisdiction
Although the U.S. formulation of “minimum contacts” reflects a
highly fact-dependent and standards-based inquiry, specific jurisdiction once seemed, as illustrated by the rule that manufacturers generally are subject to personal jurisdiction where their products cause
injury,65 to produce results in line with the more rule-based codifications found in other countries. As Linda Silberman has noted, “the
place of injury is a well-accepted jurisdictional basis . . . embraced in
national law in many countries of the world,”66 including England,
Germany, France, China, and others.67 The Brussels I Recast also
63. Minsohō art. 3-7. For a general assessment, see Koji Takahashi, The
Jurisdiction of Japanese Courts in a Comparative Context, 11 J. Priv. Int’l L. 103 (2015).
64. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991) (subjecting
a contractual forum-selection clause only to scrutiny for the “fundamental fairness” of
the forum selected and ignoring the adhesive status of the contract or the burden on
the consumer to litigate in the forum selected by the defendant). One intriguing and
looming wrinkle on U.S. consent doctrine involves state attempts to extract consent to
general jurisdiction through business-registration statutes. The Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws adopts this position, see Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 44 (Am. Law Inst. 1971), and the caselaw holds analogous support, see, e.g., Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (extracted consent to specific jurisdiction under
a nonresident motorist statute). Some lower courts have held that the strong form of
consent applies to registration statutes too. See 4A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1069.2 n.25 (4th ed. 2017) (collecting cases). For expressions of skepticism, see Dodson, supra note 27, at 84; Tanya J. Monestier, Registration
Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1343,
1346 (2015).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 20–24.
66. Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a
Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 591, 593 (2012).
67. Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶ 3-1(9);
Strafprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] § 32 (Ger.); Code de procédure
civile [C.P.C.] [Civil Procedure Code] art. 46 (Fr.); Interpretation No. 5 of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2015, effective Feb. 4, 2015), arts.
24–25, CLI.3.242703(EN) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter SPC Interpretation
No. 5]. A potential exception is Canada, which recently declined to endorse a firm rule
of personal jurisdiction based on place of injury. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda,
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 89. For exposition of Van Breda, see Tanya J. Monestier,
(Still) a “Real and Substantial” Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 Fordham
Int’l L.J. 396 (2013).
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countries qualify consent to personal jurisdiction. Japan, for example,
allows consent in consumer cases only where the consumer was domiciled at the time of the consumer contract.63 In contrast to these more
flexible, fairness-based notions of consent to jurisdiction, U.S. doctrine
does not vary based on supposed unequal bargaining power or even
the status of a contract as a contract of adhesion.64 This manifestation
of U.S. doctrine is grounded in party autonomy and litigation predictability rather than in the fairness of the forum selected.
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68. Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 7.2 (providing for jurisdiction “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful
event occurred or may occur”). Interestingly, the 2019 Judgments Convention focuses
on where the act or omission that causes injury took place, not on where the injury was
suffered. 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.1(j) (providing for recognition of a judgment when “the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation arising
from death, physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, and the act or omission directly causing such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of where
that harm occurred”).
69. See, e.g., Erik Jayme & Symeon C. Symeonides, Eighth Comm’n, Inst. of Int’l Law,
Internet and the Infringement of Privacy: Issues of Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments arts. 2.1, 5 (2019) (providing for jurisdiction in the
“home state of the person who suffered or may suffer an injury” arising from injuries
caused through the use of the Internet to a person’s rights of personality, unless the
defendant demonstrates that “it did not derivate any pecuniary or other significant
benefit from the accessibility of the material in the forum State” and that “a reasonable
person could not have foreseen that the material would be accessible [or] cause injury
in that State”).
70. I should point out that other countries do not use the term “specific jurisdiction” (or “general jurisdiction”) as the United States has adopted. However, most countries do recognize the two species of case-linked and case-independent jurisdiction that
“specific” and “general” roughly refer to.
71. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909 & n.16 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
72. See text accompanying note 57. France appears to be the exception, see C.P.C.
art. 14 (jurisdiction in France over nonresidents for “obligations” to a French person),
but perhaps only when no other basis of jurisdiction can be used, see Oscar Chase
et al., Civil Litigation in Comparative Context 654 (2d ed. 2017). For a discussion, see
Clermont & Palmer, supra note 57, at 487–99.
73. Silberman, supra note 66, at 611 (“[The U.S.] focus on the forum’s connection
to the defendant . . . make[s] it impossible in the United States to [allow] creditors or
consumers to sue at home—as many other jurisdictional regimes permit.”).
74. Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, arts. 18.1–.2.
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adopts this principle,68 as do more specific international projects.69
However, the Court’s recent decisions have narrowed specific jurisdiction in several ways that depart from what many other countries
would tend to allow.70 For example, Nicastro and Walden disclaimed
that the place of injury was enough to satisfy personal jurisdiction
in a tort case. Justice Ginsburg, in her Nicastro dissent, pointedly
contrasted Nicastro’s more restrictive view with the trends and approaches elsewhere in the world.71
In addition, U.S. law’s marginalization of the plaintiff ’s connection to the forum is contrary to a foreign trend to allow adjudicatory
jurisdiction in the plaintiff ’s home state under certain circumstances.
Although most countries consider personal jurisdiction based solely
on the plaintiff ’s nationality to be exorbitant,72 they typically allow
personal jurisdiction in the plaintiff ’s home country in certain circumstances (usually for consumer contracts) that would not be permitted under U.S. law.73 For example, the Brussels I Recast allows an
EU-domiciled consumer to sue a provider in the consumer’s domicile
state, and the provider can only sue an EU-domiciled consumer in
the consumer’s domicile state.74 Swiss law allows Swiss consumers to
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D. General Jurisdiction
In contrast to U.S. trends in specific jurisdiction, which have distanced the United States from foreign trends, the U.S. trends in general jurisdiction have brought the United States more in line with the
rest of the world. Most other countries have long considered “doing
business” general jurisdiction to be exorbitant,78 and that conception
of general jurisdiction caused tension between the United States and
other countries during the 1990s attempt to develop a judgments convention.79 But the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent general jurisdiction
cases eliminate “doing business” jurisdiction and significantly narrow
general jurisdiction essentially to where the defendant is “at home.”80
This U.S. trend moves toward the approach followed in other countries. The Brussels I Recast and most countries permit general jurisdiction in the defendant’s country of domicile.81 And most jurisdictions
75. Bundesblatt [Private International Law Statute] Dec. 18, 1987, I 5-60,
art. 114(a) (Switz.).
76. See SPC Interpretation No. 5, art. 25; Interpretation No. 20 of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Application of the Law in Hearing Civil Dispute Cases Involving
Infringement of the Right of Dissemination on Information Networks (issued by the
Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 17, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art. 15, CLI.3.191740(EN)
(Lawinfochina). Chinese courts have upheld such exercises of jurisdiction even when
the defendant does not actively target the forum (unlike, say, someone who sends an
e-mail to a recipient in a particular forum). E.g., Mai Jai v. Apple Inc. & iTunes S.a.r.l.,
No. 5279 (Beijing Intermediate People’s Ct. Apr. 23, 2013) (exercising jurisdiction
over nonresidents Apple and iTunes based on a Chinese plaintiff’s iTunes download,
in Beijing, of works that infringed her copyright). For a discussion, see Jie (Jeanne)
Huang, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Location of a Server: Chinese Territorialism
in the Internet Era?, 36 Wis. Int’l L.J. 87, 94 (2019).
77. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014). To be clear, the plaintiff ’s interests
are relevant when considering the fairness factors, but they are irrelevant when assessing the minimum contacts the defendant has with the forum.
78. Chase et al., supra note 72, at 673.
79. Burbank, supra note 57, at 119.
80. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 147 (2014).
81. See, e.g., Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 4.1 (domicile); Strafprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] §§ 12–13 (Ger.) (residence); Code de procédure
civile [C.P.C.] [Civil Procedure Code] arts. 42–43 (Fr.) (for individuals, where domiciled
or, if no domicile, where resident; for corporations, where the corporation is established); Minji Minsohō [Minsohō] [C. Civ. Pro.] 1996, art. 3-2, § 1 (Japan) (for individuals, where domiciled or, if no domicile, where resident); Civil Procedure Rules 1998,
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bring their claims in courts located at their domicile.75 And Chinese
law allows certain internet-based torts to give rise to personal jurisdiction in China over a nonresident tortfeasor where the plaintiff is
domiciled or where the plaintiff accessed the information.76 By contrast, U.S. personal jurisdiction is adamant that the plaintiff ’s connections to the forum are relevant only to the extent they create a direct
link between the defendant and the forum. The U.S. refusal to accommodate certain plaintiffs’ interests in home-state litigation demonstrates U.S. doctrine’s more pointed focus on the defendant’s contacts
with the forum.77
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a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a
foreign hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate will
be unable to hold the hotel to account in a single U.S. court,
even if the hotel company has a massive presence in multiple States. . . . Similarly, a U.S. business that enters into a
SI 1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶ 3.1(1). The Judgments Convention recognizes judgment enforcement when the underlying judgment was issued by a court located in the
defendant’s place of “habitual residence.” 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4,
art. 5.1(a).
82. See, e.g., Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 63.1; 2019 Judgments
Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.2. See also ZPO § 17(1) (defining residence of a business at its “registered seat” and “administrative center”); Minsohō art. 3-2, § 3 (principal office or principal place of business); SPC Interpretation No. 5, art. 3 (where an
organization has its “principal office”).
83. Silberman, supra note 66, at 608.
84. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 141–42.
85. Id.
86. ZPO § 20.
87. Minsohō art. 3-2, § 3.
88. SPC Interpretation No. 5, art. 4.
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define the domicile of businesses to be where they have their “statutory seat,” “central administration,” or “principal place of business,” or
where “incorporated or formed.”82 This standard is close to the U.S. “at
home” standard, with its “paradigm” illustrations of place of incorporation and principal place of business.83 Indeed, in Daimler, the Court
noted that one justification for narrowing general jurisdiction was to
bring U.S. personal jurisdiction more in line with other countries.84
However, it appears that U.S. general jurisdiction now is actually narrower than that of many other countries because U.S. general
jurisdiction more rigidly resists exceptions to domicile-based general
jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to broaden general
jurisdiction beyond the paradigm examples except in extraordinary
cases, such as when a foreign corporation wholly relocates its operations temporarily to a state.85 But other countries’ formulations of
general jurisdiction permit more relaxed exceptions. In Germany, for
example, individuals’ place of long-term but temporary abode (such as
for students and certain workers) may qualify for general jurisdiction
for claims under property law.86 In Japan, if no business office can be
located, general jurisdiction is appropriate if a representative of the
business is domiciled in Japan.87 In China, an individual not domiciled in China is subject to general jurisdiction in China if they have
resided there for twelve consecutive months.88
These approaches reflect a more functional doctrine of general
jurisdiction that incorporates sensitivity to the fairness to the parties
and to the need to ensure a reasonable forum for the plaintiff. By contrast, U.S. general jurisdiction is more rigid and blind to its effects. As
Justice Sotomayor has pointed out, the rigidity of U.S. general jurisdiction means that
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E. Pendent Jurisdiction
In the United States, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s implicit rejection of
pendent jurisdiction in the single-defendant context—when one claim
satisfies personal jurisdiction but another otherwise would not—is inconsistent with many other countries’ adoption of pendent jurisdiction
in the multidefendant context. The Brussels I Recast allows pendent
jurisdiction over EU domiciliaries in any member state where one
defendant is domiciled if the claims are related.90 Many other countries’ domestic laws allow pendent personal jurisdiction over multiple
defendants when the claims are closely connected.91 These differences relate to the underlying features of personal jurisdiction. In the
United States, personal jurisdiction is a defendant-by-defendant inquiry designed to protect each defendant from its own individualized
burdens. In Europe, by contrast, personal jurisdiction is used to facilitate joinder for efficiency and consistency purposes.
F. Theoretical Bases
As Linda Silberman has noted, looking at personal jurisdiction
developments can “reveal[] the different values reflected in other systems’ jurisdictional rules.”92 U.S. personal jurisdiction once seemed
settled on the foundation of due process notions of fairness and reasonableness, but recent cases have disparaged notions of fairness93 and
have reinvigorated the idea that personal jurisdiction helps manage
89. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
90. Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 8(1) (providing for jurisdiction “in the
courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”). Interestingly,
the 2019 Judgments Convention does not mention pendent jurisdiction.
91. See, e.g., Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶¶ 3-1(3)(b),
3-1(4); Minsohō art. 3-6. One exception is Germany. See Peter L. Murray & Rolf
Stürner, German Civil Justice 517 (2004).
92. Silberman, supra note 66, at 592.
93. See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (Kennedy, J.)
(asserting that “freeform notions of fundamental fairness” are not enough).
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contract in a foreign country to sell its products to a multinational company there may be unable to seek relief in any
U.S. court if the multinational company breaches the contract, even if that company has considerable operations in
numerous U.S. forums. . . . Indeed, the majority’s approach
would preclude the plaintiffs in these examples from seeking
recourse anywhere in the United States even if no other judicial system was available to provide relief. I cannot agree
with the majority’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause
requires these results.89
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III. Observations on Personal Jurisdiction in the United States
U.S. exceptionalism in personal jurisdiction has frustrated the
formation of a multinational agreement on personal jurisdiction that
includes the United States. That is not for a lack of interest on the
part of the United States. To the contrary, the United States long
sought such a mechanism to facilitate the enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad. The United States even initiated the effort, in the late
1990s, to design a worldwide convention on personal jurisdiction.98
But other countries objected to some of the broader facets of U.S. personal jurisdiction, especially the “doing business” jurisdiction seemingly sanctioned by the Supreme Court prior to Goodyear.99 At the
time, U.S. scholars involved in the project thought it “probably too late
in the day” for the Court to scale back general jurisdiction based on
“substantial business systematically and continuously” conducted in
94. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (“As
we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. Chase et al., supra note 72, at 646.
96. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 59, pmbl.
97. 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4, pmbl.
98. Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Georges
Droz, Sec’y Gen., the Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed
with Hague Conference Document L.C. ON No. 15 (92)).
99. Silberman, supra note 66, at 614 (“The expansive interpretations of doing
business jurisdiction in the United States have been a source of criticism abroad. . . . In
the recent negotiations for a world-wide jurisdiction and judgments convention at the
Hague Conference, efforts were made to curtail that type of jurisdiction by placing it
on the prohibited list. The United States objected, and this was one of the issues over
which the Hague negotiations broke down.”). See also Linda Silberman, Comparative
Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments
Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 319, 338–46 (2002).
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sovereign prerogatives.94 The splintered decision in Nicastro confirms
that the theoretical basis of personal jurisdiction remains unsettled
in the United States. By contrast, European notions of jurisdiction to
adjudicate are more firmly established and focus on different aims.
The Brussels I Recast was designed “to lower costs by increasing certainty and diminishing procedural delays; improve access to justice,
especially for weaker parties; and create better coordination of legal
proceedings.”95 The Choice of Court Convention was premised on
the idea that personal jurisdiction should lead to “enhanced judicial
co-operation” in furtherance of “international trade and investment.”96
And the 2019 Judgments Convention reiterates the internationaltrade rationale and adds the desire to “promote effective access to
justice for all.”97 The emphases on justice “for all” and inter-sovereign
“co-operation” and “coordination” are quite different from the recent
U.S. emphases on the protection of defendants from the burdens of
litigation and the need to police inter-sovereign friction.
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100. Burbank, supra note 57, at 119.
101. For a discussion, see David Goddard, Rethinking the Judgments Convention—A
Pacific Perspective, 3 Y.B. Priv. Int’l L. 27 (2001).
102. Silberman, supra note 66, at 613.
103. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure,
50 Am. J. Comp. L. 277, 278 (2002); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards in a Comparative
Context, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 441, 442, 446 (2010); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American
Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 709, 709 (2005).
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a U.S. state.100 The judgments project stalled and was repackaged in
a far more limited form,101 ultimately resulting in the Choice of Court
Convention that was adopted in 2005 (though still not ratified by the
United States).
The judgments project was reconstituted in 2011 and resulted
in the adoption of the 2019 Judgments Convention. With the United
States having dispensed with “doing business” general jurisdiction,
and with general jurisdiction’s “at home” test looking a lot more like
general jurisdiction in other countries,102 it is not fantastical to hope
that the United States might be inclined to ratify the convention.
That hope is supported by recent statements in the Court’s opinions
comparing the U.S. doctrine with that of other countries. Although
U.S. procedure remains internally focused,103 those acknowledgments
indicate that the Court is at least taking note of international views
in ways that may be influential down the road.
But significant convergence remains unlikely, for three reasons.
First, major areas of disagreement remain. Tag jurisdiction has deep
historical ties, and the United States shows no signs of relinquishing
it. The strong form of consent, without relaxation for unequal bargaining power, is inconsistent with recent trends in other countries.
The recent narrowing of specific jurisdiction in the United States—especially without regard to the plaintiff’s connections to the forum and
disavowal of the place of injury as appropriate for personal jurisdiction
in a tort case—suggest a trend away from the laws of other countries,
as does the move to make general jurisdiction rigid. Pendent jurisdiction regarding multiple parties seems all but dead in the United
States, despite its enhancement of efficiency, as other countries recognize. Yes, some movement has been toward the rest of the world. But
there is a long way to go for more comprehensive overlap.
Second, the underlying rationales make justifications for parallelism difficult. Europe views personal jurisdiction as about intersovereign cooperation, efficiency and convenience, and fairness to all.
The United States, by contrast, continues to struggle to articulate a
clear theoretical foundation for personal jurisdiction and has vacillated between reasonableness, fairness focused on the individual
rights of each defendant, and protection of state sovereignty and alleviation of inter-sovereign frictions. It is difficult to imagine these
origin points generating similar doctrines.
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104. Codified rules do have a role to play in subconstitutional contours of U.S. personal jurisdiction, but the focus has always been on the constitutional contours as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
105. U.S. procedural exceptionalism and litigation culture means that issues of
personal jurisdiction crop up in varied places, especially in aggregate litigation, where
the issues become both contentious and politicized. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 6 (exploring the applicability of personal jurisdiction to plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation
cases); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) (applying personal jurisdiction to unnamed class members).
106. Dodson, supra note 27, at 83–84.
107. Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating Transnational Perspectives into Civil
Procedure: What Not to Teach, 56 J. Legal Educ. 524, 525 (2006); Scott Dodson, The
Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 133, 138 (2008).
108. James E. Pfander, Book Review, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 506, 509 (2008).
109. Id. at 508.
110. Id. at 507.
111. Dodson, supra note 103, at 444.
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Third, the United States is hampered mechanistically. Personal
jurisdiction in most civil law countries, and even in many common law
countries, is a creature of code and convention, which can be created
all at once with inter-sovereign compromises in mind and clear rules
set out in the codified language. Personal jurisdiction in the United
States, meanwhile, is developed primarily by case-by-case decisions
from the Supreme Court,104 whose decision making is heavily influenced by U.S. precedent, American-style litigation,105 history and tradition, federalism, and constitutional rights. It is true that the common
law process has titrated the broad standards of U.S. personal jurisdiction into some settled rule-like applications, but those applications
have tended to deviate from global analogues. Theoretically, Congress
or the Rules Committees could step in to expand or contract personal
jurisdiction in federal court without regard to state boundaries or
interstate concerns, even creating a reticulated and specific regime
akin to the Brussels I Recast. But neither Congress nor the Rules
Committees has shown interest or political will in taking on such a
project.106
All this means that U.S. personal jurisdiction is likely to evolve in
unpredictable ways in the near term and seems more likely to follow
an independent track rather than hew to foreign norms. Some areas
of parallelism might still occur, but substantial convergence is likely
to remain elusive.
Still, there is a silver lining. Comparativism is not all about convergence. One benefit is enrichment to better understand, and critique,
home systems.107 Global perspectives also confirm civil procedure’s
“universality.”108 The benefit is particularly important for law students,109 and comparativism in American civil procedure courses is
on the rise.110 Comparative personal jurisdiction seems ripe for closer
scrutiny in American classrooms. Further, the benefit is not limited
to students: “Advocates, advisers, and judges must have at least a
working knowledge of foreign procedures to be able to frame, anticipate, or decide legal issues that cross national boundaries.”111 And
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Conclusion
This Article has aimed to study U.S. personal jurisdiction in a comparative context, revealing both the similarities and convergences and
the differences and divergences. That comparison, in turn, has highlighted the different theoretical and systemic foundations at work behind the doctrine. Those differences may continue to present obstacles
to large-scale convergence. But studying them nevertheless has its
own benefits, as this Article strives to attest.

112. See John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United
States, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 545, 545 (1995).
113. Dodson, supra note 103, at 464.
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academic research provides these benefits to scholars too,112 whose
comparative study can enrich understanding and debate in academic
circles.113 For these reasons, comparative approaches to personal jurisdiction offer promising opportunities for cross-border research and
education.

